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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:

Analysis and Countermeasures on Ship Failures
during Navigation in the CJK Fairway Based on
the FTA Method

Degree:

MSc

In recent years, ship failures during navigation have frequently occurred in the Chang
Jiang Kou (CJK) Fairway of Shanghai port, and showing an increasing trend, which
has brought huge challenges to the local environment and navigation safety of ships.
This dissertation takes ship failures in the CJK Fairway as the research object, makes
analysis (to the factors leading to the failures) and points out that the unique
hydrological characteristics and the complex navigation environment of the CJK
Fairway are the external causes of frequent ship failures, and poor ship management
and human factors are the internal causes of frequent ship failures. Based on the ship
failures data accumulated by the local maritime authorities in the past five years, the
author sorts out the pattern for the ship failures. By using the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
method, a Fault Tree with ship failures during navigation in the CJK Fairway as the
top event is established, and qualitative and quantitative analysis are carried out. Based
on the results of the analysis, the author puts forward to relevant stakeholders the
feasible measures for reducing the ship failures in the CJK Fairway. At the same time,
future challenges are also discussed.
KEY WORDS: CJK Fairway, ship failures during navigation, FTA
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Shipping, as an important carrier of international transportation, has made
extraordinary contributions to the development of world interconnection, globalization
and global economy by transporting more than 80 per cent of global trade to peoples
and communities all over the world (IMO, 2020). However, according to IMO (2002),
“While shipping is one of the most international industry of all the world, it is also
perhaps one of the most dangerous.” In the process of ship’s operation, it is necessary
not only to resist external risks such as severe weather, complicated navigation
environment, piracy, etc., but also to prevent internal risks such as ship equipment
failures, poor maintenance, structure of the ship, special features of the goods, and
human errors, etc. To this end, maritime stakeholders such as Member States, IMO,
classification societies have performed their duties and worked together to formulate
a large number of maritime regulations in the field of enhancing the safety of ships
and public safety, such as SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW, MLC, ISM Code and Rules of
RO (Recognized Organization).
However, these regulations have not been able to prevent ship failures or accidents

completely. What we can do is to find out the factors that affect the safe operation of
ships by analyzing the risks as comprehensively as possible, and devote our limited
energy to those special factors so as to minimize safety threat to the ship.
Ship failures during navigation refer to such a state of the ship: when the ship is
navigating at sea as scheduled, a sudden failure of the machinery or equipment on
board the ship may occur which cannot be repaired immediately, making the ship
unable to sail according to the officer's wishes, and the ship's maneuvering is restricted
or the ship is completely out of control. Cases have shown that in the densely nearshore
channel, limited operations or loss of control due to ship failures will give rise to an
urgent situation for surrounding ships, and may lead to block of the channel, collisions,
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oil spills, sinking of ships, or even serious casualties.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is one of the important methods often used in safety system
engineering. It is mainly used to identify and evaluate system hazards. It can not only

analyze the direct causes of accidents, but also reveal the potential causes of accidents
in depth (Lin & Zhang, 2007). FTA is a widely used technique to estimate the safety
and reliability of safety-critical systems (Qiao, Liu, Ma & Liu, 2020), such as ship
grounding accident cause analysis (Kum & Sahin, 2015), explosions in oil tankers

(Wang, Zhang & Chen, 2013) and LNG carrier accident analysis (Zhou, Wu, Zhang
& Zhang, 2017). Zhou, Wang and Ding (2002) established a fault tree about ship
engine room fires, gave the structural importance ranking of each basic event through
analysis, and proposed preventive measures. Yao, Ren and Li (2010) took ship

collision accidents as an example, and established a fault tree based on the various
factors affecting collision accidents. After making analysis, they obtained the
importance coefficient of each factor and put forward measures for controlling ship
collision accidents.
Fault tree analyses were used in the above-mentioned literature, and the influencing
factors of each research object can be identified more clearly, which has a positive
effect on improving management methods.
1.2 Target and objectives of the research
The target of the research is ship failures during navigation in Shanghai Chang Jiang
Kou (CJK) Fairway, which include North Deep-water Fairway, Extend Fairway of the

deep-water route and South Fairway. These areas are under the coverage of Wusong
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) center, and are under administration of Wusong Maritime
Safety Administration (MSA) which is one of the branches of Shanghai Maritime
Safety Administration (Shanghai MSA).
Statistics show that in recent years, ships in Shanghai’s CJK Fairway have experienced
frequent failures and the situation is becoming worse. Ship groundings, collisions and
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even oil spills are often related to ship failures, posing a major threat to the good order
and safety of navigation, ship safety, crew life and the local marine environment.
This paper analyzes a large number of ship failure data accumulated from 2015 to 2019

on the Shanghai CJK Fairway, classifies the causes for ship failures, identifies
common factors that affect ship failures, and builds a fault tree based on the analyses.
Through qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, the importance of each basic
event affecting ship's failures is calculated. Based on the calculation results, it provides

reasonable suggestions on reducing ship failure rate to stakeholders such as ships, ship
management companies and competent maritime authorities.
1.3 Methodology

In order to achieve the objectives of the research, this paper uses a variety of research
methods, such as data summary, case analysis, questionnaires and the FTA method.
Firstly, a statistical analysis of 895 ship failures that occurred in the Shanghai CJK

Fairway from 2015 to 2019 carried out, and the elements analyzed include the time
and location of the failures, type of the ships, the cause of the failures. In this way, the
common pattern leading to the failures is summarized.
Secondly, typical cases are selected for making deep analysis to the causes of ship
failures.
Thirdly, as the key research method of this paper, based on the results of data analysis,
different ship system failures that caused ship failures are regarded as intermediate

events, and the specific causes of system failures are regarded as the basic events. The
paper establishes a formal fault tree based on the logical relationship between basic
events and intermediate events, conducts a qualitative analysis based on the FAT
method, and then carries out a quantitative analysis based on the average value

assigned by ship management experts to the probability of each basic event.
Based on the conclusions drawn from the above research methods, suggestions for
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reducing ship failures will be put forward.
1.4 Structure of the dissertation
This dissertation consists of 6 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background, target,
objectives and methodologies the research will use. Chapter 2 introduces the
hydrologic and navigation characteristics of the CJK Fairway, and introduces the total
numbers, types and characteristics of ship failures in the CJK Fairway in the past five
years. The hazards of ship failures are also discussed, and two typical cases are
analyzed. Chapter 3 provides patterns for ship failures in CJK Fairway. Chapter 4
provides the FAT theory, and ship failures in CJK Fairway are analyzed in detail using
the FAT method. Chapter 5 provides relevant recommendations based on the FAT
analysis, and challenges are also discussed. Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the
dissertation.

CHAPTER 2 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CJK FAIRWAY AND HAZARDS OF SHIP FAILURES
2.1 Hydrological characteristics of the CJK Fairway areas

The CJK Fairway areas are located at the entrance of the Yangtze River into the East
China Sea. Due to the large amount of sand in the Yangtze River water body (Bao,
Peng, Bao & Lou, 2020), under the years of alluvial accumulation, the sedimentation
of the Yangtze River Estuary waters is obvious (See figure 1). The natural water depth

is only 5-7 meters, and some shallow points are even less than 3 meters. With the
development of larger-sized vessels, the natural water depth cannot meet the draft
needs of large ships. Therefore, the Chinese government has invested a huge amount
of money since the 1990s, and gradually dredged a Deep-water route with a width of

350-400 meters and a water depth of 12.5 meters, and South Fairway with a water
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depth of 7 meters.

Figure 1 - Satellite picture of the Yangtze River Estuary
Source: Google map

The estuary area is a complex environmental system that is affected by the combined
action of river basin runoff and ocean tides. The tidal waves in the estuary have
completely different characteristics from the regular tide waves in the ocean. The tidal
spectrum of the estuary develops to a more complex shallow-water tidal spectrum, and

the tidal wave energy is redistributed, making the tides show significant nonlinear
deformation and asymmetry. The estuary of the Yangtze River is a tidal estuary of
moderate intensity with irregular half-diurnal tides (Cao &Ji, 2018). The maximum
and average tidal range can reach 4.62m and 2.67m respectively (Lu, Wu & Tong,

2019).
In winter, the Yangtze River estuary is often hit by cold waves, which bring strong
winds and waves. In summer and autumn, typhoons in the Western Pacific often affect

the region. Strong winds with wind force greater than 6 prevail for an average of 63
days per year, and strong winds with wind force greater than 7 last for an average of
42 days per year. In addition, in winter and spring, foggy weather often occurs, with
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an average annual foggy day of 28.8 days (Dong, 2015).
Unlike in other coastal ports in China, the unique hydrologic characteristics of the
estuary make it more difficult for ships to navigate in the CJK Fairway, because the

main engine rotation speed and rudder angle of the ship should keep changing to
maintain the course of the ship. Fog and high winds also pose challenges to the officers
on board the ships.
2.2 Navigation characteristics of the CJK Fairway

Wusong MSA
Extend Fairway of Deep-water

★

D
C

Huangpu River

A
B

Figure 2 - Schematic diagram of the CJK Fairway
Note: A: CJK A precautionary area
B: CJK B precautionary area
C: Yuan Yuan Sha precautionary area D: Wu Song Kou precautionary area
Source: China MSA

Figure 2 above is a schematic diagram of the CJK Fairway. The CJK Fairway includes
the CJK Deep-water Fairway (54 nautical miles) and South Fairway (45 nautical
miles). The CJK Deep Water Fairway is divided into two parts: North Deep-water
fairway (43 nautical miles) and Extend Fairway of Deep-water (11 nautical miles).
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The Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) is implemented in CJK Fairway, and Wusong
VTS center which is one of a department of Wusong MSA， provides traffic
organization service, information service and navigation aids service for the water
areas.
The provinces near the mouth of the Yangtze River are the most economically
developed regions in China, with huge international trade volume, and the mouth of
the Yangtze River is the only way for ships to enter the hinterland of China, as a result,
the flow of ships is very dense in the CJK Fairway. It can be seen from Table 1 that in
the past three years, there were 170-190,000 navigable vessels in the CJK Fairway
annually, and the total number of navigable vessels is on the rise. Figure 3 is a realtime navigation dynamic map generated based on the ship's Automatic Identification
System (AIS) signal, and each triangle represents a ship. It can be intuitively felt from
the picture that traffic in the CJK Fairway is very dense.
Table 1 - The total number of navigable vessels in the CJK Fairway in the past three
years
North Fairway

South Fairway

Total

2017

69,799

105,394

175,193

2018

63,043

110,901

173,944

2019

64,644

124,857

189,501

Source: Wusong VTS
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Figure 3 - Real-time navigation dynamic map of the CJK Fairway
Source: http://www.shipxy.com/

Since the deep-water route is an artificial dredging channel and the width of the
channel is limited, deep draft ships must strictly follow the channel direction when
navigating in the deep-water channel. Leaving the channel will cause the ship to
ground.
In addition, there are many meeting points for ships in the CJK Fairway. For example,
in the Yuan Yuan Sha precaution zone in Figure 2, large ships in the North Fairway
will meet with ships in the South Fairway; in the Wu Song Kou precaution zone, ships
sailing on the Yangtze River will meet Ships going in and out of the Huangpu River or
ships in and out of the Wusongkou anchorage. Since small vessels like to sail by tide
to save fuel, the density of ships in a day is not evenly distributed. During the
transitional period from low tide to high tide, the Wu Song Kou precaution zone will
be very dense with ships, making it the most complicated navigation environment in
the CJK fairway.
The unique hydrological and navigable characteristics make the waters of the CJK
Fairway one of the busiest channels in the world. When a ship sails here, the seafarers

need to keep focus at all times and keep a safe distance from the surrounding ships,
and the engineers should ensure that the power equipment in the engine room are
always in a reliable operation state and maintain the ship's good maneuvering
8

performance.
2.3 The number of ship failures during navigation in the CJK Fairway in recent
years
According to Regulation 15 of the “Measures for the Administration of Navigation
Safety of the CJK Deep-water fairway” issued by Shanghai MSA, “If an accident or
dangerous situation occurs or is discovered on a ship, there is or is suspected of having
hull, power equipment, control equipment and other abnormal conditions that affect
navigation safety, the ship should notify surrounding ships in time and report to
Wusong VTS Center at the same time.” (Shanghai MSA, 2018).

The author made a statistic on the ship failure data received or discovered by Wusong
VTS center in the CJK Fairway during the past five years from 2015 to 2019. As shown
in Figure 4, a total of 895 ship failures occurred during the five years from 2015 to
2019. There were 99 ships failures during navigation in the CJK Fairway in 2015, but

in the following four years, the number of ship failures increased year by year. In 2017,
the number of ship failures increased significantly with an increase of 87% compared
with the figure in 2016. In 2019, a historical record was set for 259 ship failures in the
fairway, and an average of 5 ship failures occurred every week, which was 2.6 times

that of 2015.
300
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Figure 4 - Number of ship failures in the CJK Fairway from 2015 – 2019
Source: Author

According to statistics from Wusong MSA, nearly 50% of the ship accidents in the
jurisdiction are related to the loss of control caused by the ship's failure. It can be said
that the situation is very serious whether from the perspective of the accidents that may
be caused by ship failures or from the increasing trend of the number of ship failures.
Therefore, conducting research on ship failures, discovering the patterns and root
causes, and making suggestions to reduce ship failures is of great significance to
maintaining the safety and stability of the CJK Fairway.
2.4 Hazards of ship failure in the CJK Fairway

In view of the special hydrological and navigable characteristics of the CJK Fairway
water areas, the failure of ships in CJK Fairway during navigation is very harmful.
Ship failures can make the ship slow down or face restriction in operation, and even
make the ship lose control and lead to secondary accidents. In the following parts, the

paper analyzes the hazards of ship failures from the perspective of the impact on ships,
crews, management companies, the environment and the navigation environment.
2.4.1 Hazards to ships
The failure of the ship firstly will make the ship unable to sail normally, the operation
was restricted or completely out of control, and the tugs will be required to tow the
ship to the nearest anchorage for repair. If the fault is caused by damage of machines,

spare parts often need to be imported from abroad if the ship has no spare parts on
board, and the ship has to wait in the anchorage for many days, which will cause the
delay of voyage. If the ship collides with another ship or runs ground, the structure of
the ship may be damaged and needs to be repaired at the shipyard, which will also

cause delays in the shipping schedule. In the most severe case, a ship collision will
cause the ship to sink.
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In addition, the Shanghai MSA will send Port State Control Officers (PSCOs) to go on
board the ship for inspection if the ship failure at the entrance channel of the CJK
Fairway. Compared with the inspection of ships in normal operation, PSCOs will
inspect the failure ships in more details. If serious deficiencies are found, the ships will
be detained immediately until the relevant deficiencies are rectified. This

can

be

seen as a punitive measure taken by local maritime authorities for promoting the level
of ship management.
2.4.2 Hazards to crew
The crew will feel nervous and stressful when a ship breaks down in the CJK Fairway,
and carries this emotion in repairing the fault. Under high stress conditions, the

judgment and execution capacity of the crew will be greatly reduced, and human error
is more likely to occur which will lead to secondary accidents.
In addition, collisions caused by ship failures will directly threaten the safety of crew

members.
2.4.3 Hazards to ship management companies
For ship management companies, voyage delays and ship repairs caused by ship
failures will increase ship operating costs and reduce operating revenue. If the vessel
frequent failure caused frequent delays, it will reduce the company's reputation, and
resulting in reduced cargo supply. If the ship is detained during the Port State Control
(PSC) inspection after the failure, it will also lead to the degradation of the company's
performance, which may result in the shortening of the PSC inspection window for the
ships managed by the entire company.
In addition, if collisions and oil spills occur after a ship failure, the company will also
face a huge claim from parties concerned.
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2.4.4 Hazards to the environment
The collision caused by the ship's failure may cause oil spills and seriously damage
the ecological environment of the Yangtze River Estuary. The Yangtze River is the
main source of drinking water in Shanghai, and if there is a large-scale oil spill, the
safety of drinking water for Shanghai residents will be seriously threatened.
2.4.5 Hazards to navigation environment
The CJK Fairway is an artificial dredging channel. Ships with a draft of more than 7
meters can only navigate safely in the deep-water route. If large vessels break down in
the deep-water channel and cannot be repaired in a short time, the "golden waterway"

of the Yangtze River will be blocked directly, making it impossible for other large
vessels to enter or leave normally.
2.5 Analysis of typical ship failure cases
Case 1:
At 15:20 on July 28, 2017, when an oil tanker called “YU SHUN 217” navigated in
the entrance channel of Extend Fairway of Deep-water route, the connection ring of
the hydraulic oil pump of the steering gear suddenly broke. As a result, the steering
gear lost hydraulic power, and the rudder angle was stuck at amidships and cannot be
changed.

The failure of the steering gear made “YU SHUN 217” unable to change her course in
the busy CJK Fairway, so the captain immediately slowed down the main engine to
reduce the speed of the ship. But as the speed decreased, the ship's course became
unstable under the influence of the water flow and begins to turn sharply to the port

side. The helpless captain could only watch “YU SHUN 217” to collide with the bulk
carrier “XIN HAIFU” which was navigating in the same direction on the port side at
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buoy D51 ten minutes after the steering gear failure happened.
The gross tonnage of “XIN HAIFU” is 8236, while the gross tonnage of “YU SHUN
217” is 499. Due to the large tonnage difference, “XIN HAIFU” was not significantly

damaged after the collision, but there were multiple cracks in the port side of “YU
SHUN 217”, and the bulkhead of its No. 2 cargo hold was cracked.
After the collision, water flooded into “YU SHUN 217” and the ship listed to portside.

In order to maintain the stability of the ship and prevent the ship from overturning, the
captain of “YU SHUN 217” directly pumped out nearly 88 tons of fuel oil loaded in
the port No. 2 and No. 3 holds into the Yangtze River, which resulted in a severe
pollution to nearby waters (see Figure 5).

Figure 5 – Failure of “YU SHUN 217” caused a severe oil pollution
Source: Author

Case 2:
At 20:35 on April 28, 2018, when a ship called “HUA JIANG 10” navigated near buoy
D41 of North fairway entrance channel, the main engine suddenly stopped and the

engineer could not find the cause, which rendered the ship out of control. The diesel
engine of generator was also stopped 15 minims later, and the ship was blacked out.
Although the master wanted to use the remaining speed to guide the ship to safe waters,
13

but the speed of the ship dropped quickly after power off, and the ship immediately
lost control completely.
In order to control the ship from colliding with nearby ships, the master dropped an

anchor regardless of the fact that the ship was in the no-anchor zone with
communication cables buried under the water. However, due to the excessive inertia
of the ship, the connection between the anchor chain and the hull broke, and the ship
did not stop as the master planned. Subsequently, the ship was pushed to a shallow

point by the current and grounded, which led to the list of the ship.
Fortunately, the anchor did not cause any damage to the underwater cables. The ship
was pulled out with the assistance of the tug at nest high tide, and there was no oil

spill.
When the maritime investigation officer boarded the ship to investigate the cause of
the failure, it was discovered that the ship’s loss of control was caused by human error.
The chief engineer of the ship had just shifted on board at the previous port and was
working on that ship for the first time. When the chief engineer toured the engine room
before the incident, he found that the carbon dioxide release control box for the oil
purifier room was not properly closed, so he opened the box and closed it again.
However, for fire safety considerations, there is an interlock device in the control box
(see Figure 6). When the release box opened, the power of fuel supply pump and the
fan of the engine room will automatically be cut off, but the chief engineer had no idea
about it. The main engine stopped in no time due to the lack of the fuel.
After the main engine stopped, the chief engineer found that the fuel pump switch in
the engine control room was disconnected, but the switch couldn’t be switched on.
Because as the design of the fuel supply system of the ship, the system should be reset
at the fuel oil supply unit firstly after being switched off, but the engineers of the ship
did not know that, so the fuel pump could not be started again. Fifteen minutes later,
the diesel engine of generator ran out the fuel in the pipeline and stopped working led
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to black out. The fault was not removed until the ship ultimately grounded.

Figure 6 - Interlock device in CO2 release control box
Source: Author

CHAPTER 3 REGULARITIES OF SHIP FAILURES IN THE CJK FAIRWAY
3.1 Types and characteristics of ship failures in the CJK Fairway during 2018 and
2019
The author analyzed all 506 ship failure records collected by Wusong VTS in 2018
and 2019 one by one, and classified them according to the causes of ship failures. All
the cases are divided into main engine failure, steering gear failure, cooling water

system failure, black out and generator engine failure, etc. The main engine failures
are subdivided into the main engine component failure, main engine fuel system
failure, main engine cooling system failure, main engine electronic system failure,
main engine control system failure and main engine lubricating oil system failure. The

analysis of the data lays the foundation for the research in the following parts.
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3.1.1 Analysis to main engine failures
Judging from the causes of failures reported to Wusong VTS by ships, main engine
failures have been the main cause of ship failures over the years. In 2018, a total of
186 ship main engine failures occurred in the CJK Fairway, accounting for 80% of all
failures that year; in 2019, 194 ship main engine failures occurred in the CJK Fairway
accounting for 75% of failures for the year.

Due to the similar causes of main engine failures in each year, only the main engine
failure events in 2019 are analyzed in detail here.
Table 2 - Analysis of the main engine failure of the CJK Fairway in 2019
Type of failures

Number of
failures

Proportion

Causes
Failure of governor, supercharger,
exhaust valve, cylinder head start
valve, piston ring, cylinder liner,
bearing and other wear and
pressure parts
High-pressure oil pipe rupture,
high-pressure oil pump failure,
fuel injection nozzle clogged, oil
pump suction filter blocked
Sea water suction filter blocked、
cooling pipe rupture

Main engine
component failure

78

41.2%

Main engine fuel
system failure

62

31.9%

29

14.9%

11

5.7%

Short out of circuit board

8

4.1%

Air control system failure、
Control element failure

6

3.1%

Low lubricating oil pressure due
to filter blocks

Main engine cooling
system failure
Main engine
electronic system
failure
Main engine control
system failure
Main engine
lubricating oil
system failure
Source: Autor

Table 2 above shows the common categories of main engine failures, and the following
is a detailed analysis to the causes of main engine failures:
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1) Main engine component failures
It is the largest number of failures by this type all of failure throughout the year
which accounts for 41.2% of total failures. According to the data statistics, the failure

probability of the pressure-bearing and wear-prone parts in the main body parts is
higher. For example, stuck of the cylinder exhaust valve, worn of the turbocharger
bearing and the breakdown of turbocharger screws, turbines and other small
components take up a large number of all faults.
On the one hand, the working environment of such parts is poor and it is indeed
prone to wear and tear. At the same time, the frequent occurrence of such failures also
reflects that the daily maintenance and inspection of the main engine of the ship is not
in place, and the company's maintenance of the fleet is insufficient, or Safety
Management System (SMS) operation relate to main engine maintenance is not in a
good order. For example, as for cylinder liner wearing, after on-site inspection by the
MSA officer, it was found that most of the engineers did not pre-pressure the
lubricating oil according to the requirements of the SMS documents before starting,
which leading to the occurrence of cylinder wearing.
2) Main engine fuel system failures
The fuel system failure accounts for a high proportion and has distinct
characteristics. From the data analysis in 2019, the main engine high-pressure fuel pipe
rupture, high-pressure fuel pump failure, and high-pressure fuel nozzle blockage have
become the three most common faults in the fuel system. From the high-pressure fuel
pump to the fuel pipe and the fuel nozzle, it is the last step before the ship's fuel enters
the cylinder, and it is also the part with the greatest pressure in the entire fuel system.
The root cause of the failure is that the components are damaged by long-term high
pressure.
This type of failure is one of the common types of failures of ships and has
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attracted the attention of the industry. According to SOLAS (2014) Chapter II-2
Regulation 4.2, “External high-pressure fuel delivery lines between the high-pressure
fuel pumps and fuel injectors shall be protected with a jacketed piping system capable
of containing fuel from a high-pressure line failure.”, and “The jacketed piping system
shall include a means for collection of leakages and arrangements and shall be
provided with an alarm in case of a fuel line failure.” Ships should pay great attention
to this, and maritime departments should also carry out related inspection.

In addition, in the case of fuel system failures, the blockage of filters is also very
common, which indicates that the maintenance of the fuel filter by engineers is not
good enough.

3) Main engine cooling system failures
In 2019, a total of 29 ships met with main engine cooling system failures when
navigating in the CJK Fairway, which led to slow down of the engine. The main failure
types can be divided into two categories, one is the clogging of the seawater inlet filter,
and the other is the rupture of the cooling water pipe. According to the investigation,
the filter or water pipe were mostly blocked by small fish groups, leading to the failure
of cooling water supply. Such faults have their own seasonal pattern and often occur
more frequently in fish season every year. The main causes of water pipe rupture were
aging and corrosion of water pipe and lack of daily inspection and maintenance of
cooling water pipe.
4) Failures in main engine electronic system, control system and lubricating
system
The number of failures involving the main engine electronic system, control
system and lubricating oil systems throughout the year was not high, accounting for

about 14%. The overall performance is that the control unit circuit board is shortcircuited, the control system components are aging, and the oil pump is faulty resulting
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in low pressure. Sometimes, a certain ship failure will cause the failure of other
systems, such as the failure of the ship's lubricating oil system will often causes the
main engine cylinders abnormal wear and damage the cylinder liner.

It should be noted that the causes of such failures on some ships were related to
the rude operations of ships. For example, in order to overcome the rapid fluctuation
of tide in the deep-water channel or overtake the forward ship, the ship suddenly
increased the load, leading to the failure of the main engine due to too high load. Before

ships entering the CJK Fairway, or during deep-water navigation, they need to make
full estimation and preparation for the characteristics of the waters.
3.1.2 Analysis of all failure types
The author classified the causes of all ship failures in 2018 and 2019. The failure of
the main engine was the main cause, and there were other types of failures, as shown
in Figures 7 and 8:
2% 4% 1%
6%

7%

Main engine
Generator engine
Steering engine

80%

Windlass

Navigation device
Others

Figure 7 – Failure types in 2018
Source: Author
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Figure 8 – Failure types in 2019
Source: Author

According to statistics, a total of 247 ship failures occurred in the CJK Fairway in
2018, of which 186 main engine failures accounted for 80% of the total annual failures,
followed by steering gear failures (16 times), accounting for 7% of the total, and the
third type of top failure is generator engine failures (15 times), accounting for 6%.
From the data point of view, main engine failures have the largest volume, which is
the most prominent problem of ship failures in CJK Fairway.
There were a total of 259 ship failures in 2019, including 194 main engine failures,
accounting for 75% of the total number of annual failures, followed by 30 steering
gear failures, accounting for 11.6%, and 11 cooling water system failures, accounting
for 4.2%, in the third category. The main engine failure and steering gear engine failure
were still the main causes of ship failures.
However, it is worth noting that although the number of steering gear engine faults
were far less than that of the main engine, its influence to the ship was more obvious.
Most of CJK Fairway is narrow waterway, which requires very high stability of ship’s
heading. The loss of rudder effect of a ship will lead to grounding, collision and other
traffic accidents in a short time. Compared with ship losing power, the danger of
steering gear failure is more urgent, which deserves more attention.
It would also be dangerous to lose power for the whole ship (black out). The ship will
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lost power and out of control if the ship’s emergency generator couldn’t start up and
supply power in 45s by the requirement of SOLAS Chapter II-2 Regulation 43“Emergency source of electrical power in cargo ships”, and secondary accidents like
collision may happen.
In addition, failures of ship's navigation aids were mainly manifested as failures of
ship's AIS, radar and compass, and more than half of the failures were caused by AIS.
3.2 Ship types
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3%

10%

Muti-purpose ship

18%

Oil and chemical tanker
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14%

General cargo ship

54%

Others

Figure 9 – Ship types of failure ships in 2018
Source: Author
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Figure 10 – Ship types of failure ships in 2019
Source: Author

From Figure 9 and Figure 10 the types of ship failures in 2018 and 2019, it can be
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found that the proportion of each type of failed ships has not changed much. The main
types of ships that have failed are bulk carriers, oil tankers, container ships and multipurpose ships.

The number of bulk carrier failures exceeded 50% in these two years. It is understood
that bulk carriers are the ships with higher profits in the shipping market at present,
and the total number of ships entering and leaving the channel is relatively high.
Meanwhile, the failure rate of these ships is also relatively high among all types of

ships.
3.3 Regions where failures happened

According to the statistics of the water areas where the failures occur, the ship failure
distribution shows a trend of the outside water areas happened more than internal water
areas, and the North fairway and South fairway are the main regions where the ship
failure occurs (see Figure 11).
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deep-water

2019

Figure 11 – Failures that took place by regions in 2018 and 2019
Source: Author

On the one hand, the North fairway and South fairway are relatively long and can
accommodate a large number of ships. On the other hand, affected by the hydrologic
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characteristics of the channel, the current in the channel is faster, so the ships need to
change the rudder angle or speed of the main engine frequently and the output power
fluctuates greatly, which will easily lead to the increase of the failure rate of the ship's
main engine, steering engine, generator and other equipment.
3.4 Month when failures happened
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Figure 12 – Month when failures happened during 2018 and 2019
Source: Author

According to the statistics shown in Figure 12, ship failures have obvious seasonal

characteristics, mainly in winter and summer. Relatively speaking, high temperatures
in summer are more likely to cause various types of ship failures. On the one hand,
marine electromechanical equipment work in high temperature in summer, which
requires higher cooling capacity and heavier equipment load. On the other hand, the

high temperature of engine room in hot season makes the working environment of
engineers more severe and easy to fatigue. Therefore, the maintenance and repair of
equipment may not be in place, which may easily cause equipment failure.

In addition, due to the continuous efforts of the Chinese government in environmental
protection, the water quality of the Yangtze River and the ecological environment of
the Yangtze Estuary have been significantly improved. In summer, wild fish in the
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Yangtze River estuary increase significantly, increasing the risk of blocking the filters
due to the large number of small fish that are inhaled by the seawater cooling system
when the ship passed the fish school. Once the filter is blocked, the cooling capacity
will be insufficient, leading to the failure of the main engine or the auxiliary engine.
Such cases have increased obviously in recent years.
3.5 Human factor analysis for ship failures

Although the most direct cause of ship failures is malfunction of the main engine,
steering gear and other equipment, if we analyze the causes of these equipment failures
in depth, we can find that human factors play an important role in the process of
equipment failures.
According to Andrea (2019), the human error is an inappropriate or unacceptable
human decision or action that degrades efficiency, safety or system performance. By
Catherine (2006), the human element is the most unpredictable factor, given that

everyone has different behavior and understanding with the safety management not
only in emergency situations but also during daily routine.
Graziano (2016) said that most accidents involve the interaction between humans,
organizations and systems. Report from Allianz (2017) even stated that it is estimated
that 75% to 96% of marine accidents can be attributed to human error.
Human errors can be caused by failure to maintain the equipment as required by SMS,
mis-operation, fatigue, stress, communication barrier, etc. Due to the development of
new technology on ship, the reliability of equipment is getting higher and higher, and
the functions are becoming more and more comprehensive, but this has led to the
excessive dependence of the crew on the equipment. As a result, the crews are at a loss
in the event of equipment failure, and the emergency response capability is
insufficient.
On the other hand, while the ships become bigger and bigger, the manning become
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less and less, and with more and more maritime conventions coming into force, crews
on board ships undertake much more jobs than before. The rest time of seafarers are
squeezed, therefore, they feel more stressful and easier to fatigue. Sanpson (2017)
states that the feeling of ‘severe’ fatigue of seafarers has been increased from 24% in
2011 to 36% in 2016.
According to the study by Professor Baumler from WMU, people’s performance will
vary with different workload as shown in Figure 13. When the workload is too low,

people's attention is difficult to concentrate, performance is at a low level, and the
system is in an unsafe state. As the workload increases, people's performance will
gradually improve until it reaches a peak, the probability of human error will gradually
decrease, and the system is in a safe state. But when the workload is too heavy, people's

performance will decrease rapidly after the peak, human errors will increase
significantly, and the system will be in an unsafe state or out of control.

Figure 13 – Relationship between work performance and workload
Source: Professor Baumler from WMU

This is because the cognitive resources of people are limited, and demanding and
complex tasks require large resources (Baumler, 2019). When people in an over-load
condition, they don’t have enough capacity to deal with the complex situation.
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When a ship is navigating in the CJK Fairway, due to the complicated hydrological
and navigable environment, the seafarers must always pay attention to ensure the safe
navigation of the ship. At this time, the workload of the seafarers is already at a
relatively high level or even overload. If ship failure happens at this time, it is difficult
for the seafarers to have extra cognitive resources to deal with emergencies, and the
crew will in an overloaded working state. According to the above analysis, the
performance of the crew will rapidly decrease and human errors will increase.

Among the ship failure events in CJK Fairway, a large portion of them were related to
human factors. Such as in the Case 1 mentioned in 2.5, the break of the connection
ring of hydraulic oil pump was because the engineer didn’t maintain the steering
system as schedule. In Case 2, the direct cause of the failure is mis-operation by the

chief engineer.

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS BASED ON THE FTA METHOD
4.1 The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) theory
4.1.1 Overview of FTA theory
Since the early 1960s, after the application of FTA and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) in
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of
Defense of America, FTA technology has experienced a development process from

simple to complex, from static to dynamic, from traditional to fuzzy. In 1974, a
scientific research team led by Rasmussen of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in the United States, using FTA and ETA analysis methods, published the
famous WASH-1400 risk assessment report on pressurized water reactor accidents,

which caused great shock in the industry. Based on this, the FTA theory was born (Han,
2020). In 1977, Lapp and Powers proposed a non-coherent correlated fault tree model
using computational automatic construction, which opened up a new method of
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computer automatic construction and once again pushed FTA research to a new high
level (Shi & Wang, 1993). At present, as a means of evaluating system reliability and
safety, FTA has been widely used in aerospace, nuclear energy, electric power,
chemical industry, machinery, transportation, civil engineering and other fields.
The FTA method is a method of analyzing and diagnosing using logic block diagrams,
which is widely used in equipment failure safety diagnosis and analysis. With the
progress of industry, FTA has been improved and strengthened, and formed a complete

program and theory, which has been developed and used a lot (Cao & Cheng, 1986).
Before understanding the fault tree theory, we must first understand the nature of the
fault tree.
Essentially, the fault tree is a special tree-like logic diagram that graphically shows
how the system fails (Purba, 2014). The input event of the logic gate is the "cause" and
the output event is the "effect". Through layer-by-layer analysis of all influencing
factors that may cause system failures, the logical relationship between equipment
failures and various influencing factors is revealed. Therefore, the fault tree is similar
to a system "snapshot" of a specific fault state (Ruijters & Stoelinga, 2015). It can not
only reveal the various cause of system faults, display the weak links of the system,
but also calculate the probability of each fault and evaluate each from different
perspectives and evaluate the importance of each module from different perspectives.
The FTA method takes an undesired product failure event as the analysis target, and
find all possible causes one by one from upwards to downwards, so as to calculate the
logical relationship between various bottom events and top events that may exist in the
analyzed system such as component failures, environmental influences, and human
factors, and represented by an inverted tree diagram (Gusmao, Sliva, Poleto, Sliva &
Costa, 2018). After building the fault tree, qualitatively analyze the combination
method and combination path of each bottom event's impact on the top event, and
quantitatively calculate the degree of such impact, and calculate the probability of
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causing the system failure that needs to be analyzed (Yeh & Simmons 2013).
4.1.2 Advantages and disadvantages of the FTA method

Fault tree analysis is often used at various stages such as system design, trial
production and normal operation, and its characteristics are: simple, fast, convenient,
image, etc. (Yao, 1989).

Advantages of FTA are:
1) Rather than being subject to a general reliability analysis of the analysis object, it is
possible to analyze all its failure modes. It can not only analyze the effect of certain
component failures on the analysis object, but also study the factors that cause the
failure (Liu, 2003).
2) The graphics of the fault tree can well reflect the internal relationship of the system,
and at the same time reveal the relationship between the component failure and the
system failure, and discover the hidden dangers of the system (Guo, Qi & Li, 2018).
3) The FTA can not only conduct qualitative research on failure events, but also
quantify the probability of occurrence of failure events, and apply first-hand data to

safety assessment.
4) The fault tree analysis method can be programmed with software, which can build
a more complete system.
Disadvantages of FTA are:
1) For larger or more complex system, the establishment of fault tree takes a longer
time, which increase the difficulty of calculate (Ferdous, Khan, Veitch & Amyotte,
2009). Due to the large number of failures, it is necessary to establish fault tree by
personnel with rich technical knowledge and strong analytical capability.
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2) The FTA has a high requirement for data statistics, and the fault of each system
needs to be analyzed separately.
4.1.3 Common terms and symbols of fault trees
Because the fault tree is presented through a graph, it is necessary to introduce some
specific logical relationship gate symbols, event symbols, and basic terms to illustrate
the logical relationship and causality between events and events. The establishment of

a fault tree requires many symbols. For the research needs of this article, only events
and their symbols and logic gates and their symbols are introduced.
The occurrence of conditions or actions is called events, which includes:
Top event: It is the result event of the joint action of all events. The top event is located
at the top of the fault tree and is the target of fault analysis. It is always the output
event of the logic gate in the fault tree in question rather than the input event.
Intermediate event: It is the resultant event between bottom event and top event. The
intermediate event is the output event of a certain logic gate, and at the same time the
input event of other logic gates.

Bottom event: Located at the bottom of the fault tree, it is the influencing factor event
that can only cause other events in the analysis method, and can only be used as the
input event of the logic gate rather than the output event.

Basic event: The bottom event that does not need to be ascertained.
The symbols of each tape of event can be indicated as Table 3 shows.
Table 3 – Symbols of events
Symbols

Events
Top event or intermediate event
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Bottom event or basic event
Source: Author

In fault analysis, logic gates describe logical causality between events.
AND gate: Indicates that the output event only occurs when all input events occur.

OR gate: Indicates that an output event occurs when at least one input event occurs.
The symbols of AND gate and OR gate can be indicated as table 4 shows.
Table 4 – Symbols of gates
Symbols

Gates

AND gate

OR gate
Source: Author

4.2 Steps of FTA method

The steps of the FTA method are to:
1) clarify the analysis scope of the system and top events;
2) build a fault tree;
3) simplified fault tree;
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4) make a qualitative analysis of the fault tree;
5) make a quantitative analysis of the fault tree (Wang, 2012).

The specific analysis process is shown in Figure 14 bellow:
Determine the top
event

Understand the
system

Investigation

Build fault tree

Determine the target and give probability data

Find the minimum
cut set

Optimize the
system

Critical principal
degree analysis

Quantitative analysis
Probability significance analysis

Find the smallest
path set

Structural importance analysis

Qualitative analysis

Calculate the probability of the top event

Technical data

Figure 14 - Analysis process flow of FTA
Source: Author

4.2.1 How to build a fault tree
1) Be familiar with system failures
Before building the fault tree of the system, it is necessary for the builder to collect
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and sort out the data and actual running state of the system extensively (Torng & Jiun,
1997). At the same time, fully familiar with the structure of the system, what functions
it has, what is the principle of operation, what are the forms of failure, and what are
the causes of the failure (Yang, 2005). Only by mastering the basic data of the system,
can the fault tree be established correctly and a reasonable fault analysis can be carried
out.
2) Confirm the top event
How to distinguish which system events are regarded as top events is the core for
establishing a fault tree. The builder can choose top events reasonably according to
their different research perspectives and the perspective of solving practical problems.
When defining the top event, the concept should be clear, so that it is easy to find the
direct cause of the top event, and use it for qualitative and quantitative analysis. When
studying the failure of the system, if it is found that there are many unwanted events
in the system, then multiple top events should be selected according to the principle of
the system and multiple fault trees should be established for analysis.
3) Construct a fault tree

Starting from the top event, find out all possible direct causes of the events at all levels
step by step, and use the corresponding symbols to indicate the events and their mutual
logical relationship, until the bottom event is analyzed.

There are two methods of tree building: artificial tree building and computer aided tree
building. Manual tree building is manual tree building, which requires a lot of work
by analysts. Computer aided tree construction is the main method to solve the
complexity of large system construction with the help of computer.
4) Fault tree normalization
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In order to make a unified description and analysis of the fault tree, the constructed
fault tree must be normalized into a fault tree containing only basic events, resultant
events, AND gate, OR gate, and NOT gate.

5) Fault tree simplification
After establishing the fault tree, analyze the faults at all levels in turn, simplify the
relationship between the faults, remove the impossible causes, phenomena and logical

relationships, and then simplify the fault tree (Sun, Wei & Yu, 2002).
4.2.2 Qualitative analysis of the fault tree
Qualitative analysis is an important function of fault tree analysis. The main goal of
qualitative analysis is to find the causes and combinations of causes that may lead to
undesirable events related to the system by calculating the cut set and the minimum
cut set. That is to find all the failure modes that lead to the occurrence of the top event,
so that the diagnostic staff can find potential failures and design weaknesses to
optimize the design, and propose feasible measures to enhance the safety factor of the
system.
1) Cut set and minimum cut set
Cut set is a collection of several bottom events that cause the top event of the fault tree
happen. The minimum cut set is the minimum bottom events that cause the top event
of the fault tree to occur. It represents a failure mode that caused the top event of the

fault tree happen.
For example, the sets that can make top events happen are:
{X1,}, {X2, X3}, {X1, X2 X3}, {X3, X4}, {X1, X4}
Since {X1} can directly cause the top event to occur, then {X1, X2 X3} and {X1, X4}
are no longer the minimum set of bottom events that cause the top event happen.
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Therefore, the minimum cut sets here are:
{X1,}, {X2, X3}, {X3, X4}
2) Ways to find the minimum cut set
The commonly used methods for finding the minimum cut set include the downlink
method and the uplink method. The downlink method is used in the later calculation
of this paper. The basic principle of the downlink method is: for each output event, if
there is an OR gate below it, then each input event under the OR gate is lined up
separately. If the following is an AND gate, then all input events under the AND gate
are arranged in the same row.

The processes of the downlink method are: Starting from the top event, proceeding
from top to bottom step by step, repeat the above principles for each resultant event
until all the resultant events are processed, and the resulting set of bottom events in
each row is a cut set of the fault tree. Finally, according to the definition of the

minimum cut set, the cut sets of each row are compared in pairs, and those rows that
are not the minimum cut set are crossed out, and the rest are all the minimum cut sets
of the fault tree.

The following is an example to demonstrate the calculation of the minimum cut set:
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Figure 15 – An example of the fault tree
Source: Author

As for the fault tree given in Figure 15, the steps of downlink method can be shown in

Table 5 bellow:
Table 5 – Steps of calculate minimum cut set use downlink method
Steps
0

1

2

3

4

5

T

E1
E2

E3
E4
E5E6

X1X2X3
X3X4
X4E6
X6E6

X1X2X3
X3X4
X4X5
X4X6
X6X5
X6X6=X6

X1X2X3
X3X4
X4X5
X6

Source: Author

Step 1: Below the top event T is an OR gate, then each input events E1 and E2 under

the gate are arranged in a row.
Step 2: Below Event E1 is the OR gate, then each input events E3 and E4 under the
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gate are arranged in a row; Below the event E2 is the AND gate, then the input events
E5 and E6 under this gate are arranged in the same row.
Step 3: Below Event E3 is the AND gate, then the input events X1, X2 and X3 under

this gate are arranged in the same row; Below event E4 is the AND gate, then the input
events X3 and X4 under this gate are arranged in the same row; Below the event E5 is
an OR gate, then the input events X4 and X6 under the gate each arranged in a row and
combined with the event E6 to form X4E6 and X6E6.
Step 4: Below Event E6 is an OR gate, then input events X5 and X6 under the gate each
arranged in a row and combined with the event X4 to form X4X5 and X4X6; Combine
with event X6 to form X5X6 and X6X6.
So far, all the resulting events of the fault tree have been processed. Each row obtained
in step 4 is a cut set.
Step 5: Make a pairwise comparison. Since {X6} is a cut set, so {X4, X6} and {X5,
X6} are not the minimum cut set and must be crossed out. Finally, all the minimum cut
sets of the fault tree are:
{X6}，{X3，X4}，{X4，X5}，{X1，X2，X3}
4.2.3 Quantitative analysis of the fault tree
The main purpose of quantitative analysis is to find the probability of the top event
and other quantitative indicators, such as the structural importance, probability
importance and relative probability importance of the bottom event when the
probability of all bottom events is given.
For the fault tree shown in Figure 15, if all the bottom events are independent of each
other, and the probability of each bottom event is as Table 6 shows:
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Table 6 - Probability of each bottom event in Figure 15
q1

q2

q3

q4

q5

q6

0.02

0.02

0.03

0.025

0.025

0.01

Source: Author

1) Disjoint Boolean algebra method to find the probability of the occurrence of
top events
As for the fault tree in Figure 15, the steps as followings:
1) According to the minimum cut sets calculated in 4.2.2, the top event can be
expressed as the simplest Boolean expression of the sum of the bottom events:

T=X6 +X3X4 + X4X5 + X1X2X3
2) Convert the above formula into disjoint Boolean sums:
തതത4 + X4 തതത
T= X6 +X3X4തതത
X6 + X4X5തതത
X6 തതത
𝑋3 + X1X2X3 തതത
X6 തതത
𝑋4 (𝑋
𝑋5 )
തതത
തതത
തതത
തതത
തതത
= X6 +X3X4X6 + X4X5X6 X3 + X1X2X3X6 X4
ഥ represents the opposite event of the bottom event Xi.
Xi
3) Calculate the probabilities at both ends of the disjointed expression in 2) to get the

probability of the top event happening.
Q (q1, q2…q6) = P (X6) + P (X3X4 തതത
X 6 )+ P (X4X5 തതത
X6 തതത
𝑋3 ) + P (X1X2X3തതത
X6 തതത
𝑋4 )
=q6 + q3q4p6 + q4q5p6p3 + q1q2q3p6p4

Where pi = 1 – qi, which means the probability that the number i bottom event not
occur. Bringing into the number to calculate, the probability of the top event occurring
is:

Q = 0.011354
2) Structural importance of the basic event
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The structure importance of the number i basic event is:

𝐼 ሺiሻ =

1
2 𝑛−1

[ ሺ 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑖−1 , 𝑥𝑖+1 , … , 𝑥𝑛 − ሺ𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑖−1 , 0, 𝑥𝑖+1 , … , 𝑥𝑛 ሻ]


ሺ𝑥1, … ,𝑥𝑖−1 ,𝑥𝑖−1 ,…,𝑥𝑛 ሻ

i = 1, 2, …, n
Where （。）is the structure function of the fault tree, σሺ𝑥1, …,𝑥𝑖−1 ,𝑥𝑖−1 ,…,𝑥𝑛ሻ 1 is the
sum of all possibles where X1, X2, …, Xi-1, Xi+1, …, Xn taking 0 or 1, respectively.
The importance of the basic event reflects the importance of each base event in the
fault tree from the point of fault tree structure.
3) Probability importance of the basic event
The probability importance of the number i basic event is:
IP (i) =

𝜕
𝜕𝑞𝑖

Q (q1, q2, … ,qn)

i = 1,2, … , n

Where Q (q1, q2, … ,qn) is the probability of the top event occurring. The probability
importance of the number i basic event means the rate of change in the probability of
the top event due to a small change in the probability of the number i basic event.
4) Relative probability importance of the basic event
The relative probability importance of the number i basic event is:
IC (i) =

𝑞𝑖
𝑄ሺ𝑞1,𝑞2,…,𝑞𝑛ሻ

•

𝜕
𝜕𝑞𝑖

Q (q1, q2, … ,qn)

i = 1,2, … , n
The relative probability importance of the number i basic event means the rate of

relative change in the probability of occurrence of the top event due to a small relative
change in the probability of occurrence of the number i basic event.
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4.3 Fault tree analysis of ship failures for ships navigating in the CJK Fairway
According to the summary of the direct causes of the failures of ships in the CJK
Fairway from 2015 to 2019 in Chapter 3, combined with the analysis of 895 cases to
find out the deep-level causes of the failures, and establish models through fault tree
theory to carry out qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis.
A fault tree drawing and analysis software FreeFat developed by Professor Meng

Xianfei of China University of Mining and Technology is used in this dissertation to
establishment, qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis of the fault tree. The
software's qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis follow the classic algorithm
described in 4.2. Because the fault tree in this article is quite large, the FreeFat software

can not only ensure the accuracy of the calculation, but also save a lot of calculation
process.
4.3.1 Determination of events
1) Define the top event
Ship failures in the CJK Fairway from 2015 to 2019 are the most important part of this
paper. Therefore, ship failures in the CJK Fairway are defined as the top event of the
fault tree.
2) Determination of intermediate events

The intermediate event is located between the bottom event and the top event, which
is the cause of ship failures. According to the analysis in Chapter 3, select common
fault types as the research object, and determine the intermediate events leading to the
top event as: main engine failure, steering gear failure, cooling water system failure,

black out and human factors.
3) Determination of basic events
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Decomposing the cause of the main engine (ME) failure, the ME component failure,
ME fuel system failure, ME cooling system failure, ME control system failure, and
ME lubricating oil system failure are obtained. After further decomposing these faults,
it is concluded that the basic events leading to the ME component failures are: exhaust
valve fault, supercharger fault; basic evens lead to fuel system failures are: fuel
injection pipe fracture, fuel injection pump fault, fuel injector block, fuel filter block;
basic events lead to ME cooling system failures are: ME water pump fault, cylinder
leakage; basic events lead to ME control system failures are: control circuit board fault,
control air system fault; basic events lead to ME lubricating system failures are: ME
lubricating filter blockage, no back up filter, lubricating oil mixed with impurities.
Decomposing the cause of the steering gear failure, the relevant basic events are:

steering gear hydraulic oil leakage, steering gear hydraulic pump fault, rudder
intertwine with rope, hydraulic control valve stuck.
Decomposing the cause of the cooling system failures, the relevant basic events are:

seawater inlet filter blocked, cooling pipe damage, large quantities of air enter the
cooling piping.
Decomposing the cause of the black out, the relevant basic events are: generator engine
suddenly shut down, generator engine can’t reset in short time.
Decomposing the cause of the human factor, the relevant basic events are: misoperation, crew not familiar with the system, fatigue.
4.3.2 Develop the fault tree
According to the above established events and combined with the logical relationship
between each event, connect all events by AND gate or OR gate. Using FreeFat

software to develop a fault tree with the failure of the ship as the top event (see Figure
16).
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Figure 16 – Fault tree of ship failures for ships navigating in the CJK Fairway
Source: Author

The corresponding event code information in the fault tree is shown in Table 7 bellow:
Table 7 - Event code information
Event Code

Event Name

Event Code

Event Name

T

Ship failures for ships
navigating in the CJK
Fairway

X8

ME cylinder leakage

M1

ME failure

X9

ME control circuit board
fault

M2

Steering gear failure

X10

ME control air system
fault

M3

Cooling system failure

X11

ME lubricating filter
block

M4

Black out

X12

No back up filter
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M5

Human factor

X13

Lubricating oil mixed
with impurities

M6

ME component failure

X14

Steering gear hydraulic oil
leakage

M7

ME fuel system failure

X15

Steering gear hydraulic
pump fault

M8

ME cooling system
failure

X16

Rudder intertwine with
rope

M9

ME control system failure

X17

Hydraulic control valve
stuck

M10

ME lubricating oil system
failure

X18

Seawater inlet filter
blocked

X1

ME exhaust valve fault

X19

Cooling pipe damage

X2

ME supercharger fault

X20

Large quantities of air
enter the cooling piping

X21

Generator engine
suddenly shut down

X3

ME fuel injection
pipe fracture

X4

ME fuel injection pump
fault

X22

Generator engine can’t
reset in short time

X5

ME fuel injector blockage

X23

Mis-operation

X6

ME fuel filter blockage

X24

Crew not familiar with the
system

X7

ME water pump fault

X25

Fatigue

Source: Author

4.3.3 Qualitative analysis of the ship failure fault tree
Through making qualitative analysis, we can find the influencing factors and the
combination of influencing factors that lead to the occurrence of top events, and find
the weak links in the system, so as to provide targeted opinions on improving design
or management. Qualitative analysis is one of the important roles of fault tree theory.
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Through using the FreeFat software and using downlink method, 20 minimum cut sets
of the fault tree can be obtained as below:
(X1), (X10), (X11*X12*X13), (X14), (X15), (X16), (X17), (X18), (X19), (X2),
(X20), (X21*X22), (X23*X24*X25), (X3), (X4), (X5), (X6), (X7), (X8), (X9).
Looking at the above minimum cut sets, it can be found that most of the minimum cut
sets consist of only one single basic event. This is due to the large number of ship

systems and the large number of key equipment on board. Although some safety
redundancy has been made in the design of ships from the perspective of safety, the
failure of a small part of a system will still cause the whole ship to lose control. This
partly reflects the vulnerability of ships to safe operation.
At the same time, it can be found that the minimum cut set that consists of a single
event is the basic event of the main engine failure, steering gear failure and cooling
water failure. In other words, in these systems, the occurrence of a single basic event
can directly lead to the occurrence of a top event.
4.3.4 Quantitative analysis of the ship failure fault tree
1) The determination of the probability of each basic event
The probability of basic event occurrence is the basis of qualitative analysis of fault
tree. However, for the 25 basic events in this paper's fault tree, it is difficult to
accurately determine their probability of occurrence. On the one hand, the situation of

each ship cannot be same, on the other hand, it is impossible to collect such a huge
amount of data.
As a solution, the author communicated with experienced experts in the industry, and

asked them to estimate the probability of each basic event through a questionnaire
survey, and then weighted the average. In order to make the estimation more accurate,
the author distributed questionnaires to 10 experts engaged in different fields (see
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Annex 1), which are: 1 PSCO from Shanghai MSA, 7 ocean-going ship chief engineers
from different ships, 1 field surveyor and 1 mechanical supervisor from shipping
company.

All the 10 questionnaires were recovered and the data were valid. The weighted
average of the occurrence probability of each basic event was shown in Table 8.
Table 8 - Probability of each basic event by questionnaire
Event Code

Probability

Event Code

Probability

X1

0.001

X14

0.003

X2

0.001

X15

0.002

X3

0.002

X16

0.002

X4

0.006

X17

0.003

X5

0.015

X18

0.007

X6

0.004

X19

0.005

X7

0.002

X20

0.004

X8

0.005

X21

0.003

X9

0.001

X22

0.01

X10

0.002

X23

0.05

X11

0.002

X24

0.05

X12

0.02

X25

0.01

X13

0.005

Source: Author

2) Structure importance analysis
According to FreeFat's calculation of the logic structure of the fault tree, the structural
importance of the basic event is as follows:

I(X20)=I(X19)=I(X18)=I(X17)=I(X16)=I(X15)=I(X14)=I(X10)=I(X9)=I(X8)=I(X7)
=I(X6)=I(X5)=I(X4)=I(X3)=I(X2)=I(X1)>I(X22)=I(X21)>I(X25)=I(X24)=I(X23)=I
(X13)=I(X12)=I(X11)
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Through the structural importance analysis, it can be found that among the bottom
events that may lead to the occurrence of the top event, the bottom events involving
main engine failure, steering gear failure and cooling water system failure have greater
structural importance. This is consistent with the proportion of fault categories.
3) Probability importance analysis
After entering the occurrence probability of each basic event into FreeFat, the

probability importance of the basic event can be obtained as shown in Table 9.
Table 9 - Probability importance of each basic event
Ranking

Probability importance

Ranking

Probability importance

1

X1(0.93774)

14

X15(0.92553)

2

X5(0.93774)

15

X16(0.92553)

3

X18(0.9301)

16

X2(0.924607)

4

X4(0.92925)

17

X9(0.924607)

5

X19(0.9283)

18

X21(0.00923)

6

X8(0.92832)

19

X22(0.00277)

7

X6(0.92739)

20

X25(0.00230)

8

X20(0.9273)

21

X23(0.00046)

9

X14(0.9264)

22

X24(0.00046)

10

X17(0.926)

23

X11(0.00009)

11

X3(0.9255)

24

X13(0.00003)

12

X7(0.9255)

25

X12(0.00002)

13

X10(0.925)

Source: Author

The probability importance analysis results are consistent with the structural
importance, showing that the basic events of the main engine failure, steering engine

failure and cooling water failure have more than 90% probability for directly causing
ship failures.
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4) Relative probability importance analysis
After entering the occurrence probability of each basic event into FreeFat, the relative
probability importance of each basic event can be obtained as shown in Table 10.
Table 10 - Relative probability importance of each basic event
Ranking

Relative probability
importance

Ranking

Relative probability
importance

1

X1(0.18431)

14

X15(0.02425)

2

X5(0.18431)

15

X16(0.02425)

3

X18(0.08531)

16

X2(0.01211)

4

X4(0.07305)

17

X9(0.01211)

5

X19(0.06082

18

X22(0.00036)

6

X8(0.06082)

19

X21(0.00036)

7

X6(0.04860)

20

X23(0.00030)

8

X20(0.04860)

21

X24(0.00030)

9

X14(0.03641)

22

X25(0.00030)

10

X17(0.03641)

23

X12(0.00001)

11

X3(0.02425)

24

X13(0.00001)

12

X7(0.02425)

25

X11(0.00001)

13

X10(0.02425)

Source: Author

Through the relative probability importance analysis, it can be found that the
probability of ship failures can be effectively reduced by reducing the main engine

failure.
CHAPTER 5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CHALLENGES IN THE FUTURE
5.1 Recommendations
As the ship equipment work under the conditions of high temperature, humidity,
vibration, and even bad weather for a long time, they are prone to all kinds of faults.
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In addition, the complex hydrologic and navigation characteristics of the CJK Fairway
further increases the possibility of failure. If a ship failure while sailing in the open
ocean, there will be enough time and space to repair it, but in the CJK Fairway with
dense ships and narrow waterways, if the ship breaks down and causes operation
restrictions or even out of control, it will easily lead to grounding, collisions and even
oil spills.
According to the above analysis, there are certain rules to follow in the failure of

vessels in CJK Fairway. First of all, the main engine failure, steering gear failure and
cooling water system failure are the most common failure types. Secondly, the
probability of ship failure is higher in the high temperature season.

According to the investigation and analysis after the accident, a large proportion of the
failures could have been avoided, either because the ship maintenance was not in place,
or the crew's emergency response was not timely, leading to a small fault that
eventually led to the loss of control of the whole ship. Therefore, based on the above

analysis, the author puts forward corresponding recommendations to vessels,
management companies and competent authorities in order to reduce the failure rate
of vessels navigating in the CJK Fairway.
4.1.1 For ship management companies
The ship management companies should carry out the main responsibility of ship
safety management and create a good safety culture atmosphere in the fleet. Firstly,
the management companies should ensure that there are sufficient resources on board,
such as personnel, spare parts and food. It is not reasonable to reduce ship manning,
spare parts inventory, and extend ship maintenance schedule in consideration of
excessive cost savings. The ship should be docked on time according to the planned
time frame. Secondly, the management companies should supervise the
implementation of the Safety Management System (SMS) on board ships. Effective
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implementation of the SMS should be strengthened by strengthening crew training
before new crew members on board the ship and enhance port inspection.
For ships navigating in the CJK Fairway, they should be informed the hydrological

characteristics, navigation characteristics and local requirements in advance, so that
the ship could be prepared in advance to ensure the ship in a good condition. Ships
with excellent safety operating records should be rewarded to increase the motivation
and sense of honor of the crew.
4.1.2 For ships navigating in the CJK Fairway
According to Article 4 of the “CJK Deepwater Channel Navigation Safety

Management Measures”, revised and implemented by the Shanghai MSA on
September 1, 2019, “Vessels intending to enter deep water channels shall be tested in
advance on main engine, steering gear, communications and emergency equipment,
etc., and ensure that they are in good technical condition” (Shanghai MSA, 2019).
Vessels shall be inspected in advance in accordance with the prescribed article,
especially the main engine systems, steering gear and cooling water systems, and any
faults shall be solved before entering the fairway. Because by the statistics and FTA,
theses system more likely failure in the CJK Fairway during sailing. In normal
operation, the crew shall maintain the ship's equipment on time according to the
maintenance plan to ensure the smooth operation of the SMS.
If a ship breaks down in the channel, the ship should report to Wusong VTS center in
time so that VTS can organize emergency response and avoid secondary accidents.
4.1.3 Supervision measures for the competent maritime authority

As for Shanghai MSA, the competent authority for navigating vessels in CJK Fairway,
the author suggests strengthening the management from the following aspects.
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1) Strengthen supervision of shipping companies
For shipping companies whose Document of Competence (DOC) certificate are issued
by Shanghai MSA, the Shanghai MSA can conduct targeted inspections when

conducting external audits of the shipping companies every year. Before the audit, the
auditors can check whether the company's ship has failure records in the CJK Fairway
in the past two years. During the audit they can focus on the company's SMS relate to
handing procedures of ship failures by looking through relevant records, and verifying

whether the SMS was implemented. In this way, shipping companies are urged to
implement their main responsibilities and improve their fleet management level.
2) Strengthen the on-site inspection of ship failures
In order to curb the rapid increase in the number of ship failures in the CJK Fairway,
Shanghai MSA issued a regulation in April 2019 to carry out 100% inspection of
vessels with electromechanical failures in the fairway and 100% detention of vessels
with serious deficiencies found in the inspection. In 2019, the detention rate of PSC
inspection carried out by Shanghai MSA was 8.4%, which was not only the highest in
all years, but also 2.7 times higher than the average detention rate of 3.13% in Tokyo
Memorandum (MOU) region (Tokyo MOU annual report, 2019).
It is suggested that when PSC or FSC inspection is carried out on the failure ships,
detailed inspection should be carried out around the equipment with fault to confirm
whether it has returned to normal state. At the same time, confirm the cause of the
accident, determine whether there is responsibility for ship safety management,
whether there are human errors, and issue specific deficiencies in the inspection report.
In addition, the ship’s daily maintenance records, personnel training records, and
related drill records should be inspected, the overall environment and condition of the
engine room should be assessed, and the ship’s problems in the management of the
ship’s machinery should be pointed out by officer and rectification should be
supervised.
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In the daily PSC or FSC inspection, the maritime authority officers should pay more
attention on the equipment easy to lead ship failures, such as main engine system,
steering gear system and cooling water system. If related deficiencies are found by
PSCOs or FSCOs, the ship should rectify them before departure.
3) Strengthen the operational inspection of seafarers
In order to reduce the failures caused by human factors, the competent authority should

carry out the seafarer’s operational inspections according to the common types of
failures in CJK Fairway during the inspection. The crew is required to be proficient in
operating the ship's machinery and equipment within the responsibility to reduce ship
failures caused by the crew's mis-operation or human error.
4) Continue to collect data to provide support for innovation in regulatory measures
In addition, it is necessary to continue collecting and sorting out the information of
failure ships, requiring the failure ships to provide more abundant and standardized
information reports, and establishing a database of ships that frequently failures in the
fairway, so that the competent authority can formulate a more scientific and targeted
management system.
5.2 Challenges in the future
Looking forward to the future, there are many factors affecting the safe operation of
ships. In view of the impact of new technology and COVID-19, this dissertation

proposes the possible impact on ship failures.
5.2.1 New technologies and human error

Driven by new technologies, more and more new equipment or systems are being used
on ships. However, these applications are mostly aimed at saving ship operating costs,
and the systems generated by new technologies are often more complex. Once fault
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occurs, the service provider often needs to be asked for help because the crew are
difficult to eliminate the fault.
A perception of technology as fully reliable and trustful, can lead to underestimating

risks and consequently to the change of attitude toward seamanship practices and
procedures (Toni, Nermin & Jelena, 2017), According to Schröder (2012) states, “new
technology may often create a false sense of confidence, and thereby lead to an
increase in the acceptance of risks”.
Therefore, contrary to popular belief, higher levels of automation mean higher safety,
“technology can contribute to the occurrence of accidents caused by human error and
hence defeat the purpose for which it was introduced” (Lutzhoft & Dekker, 2002). The

ever-increasing functions and high degree of autonomy of automation systems pose
challenges for monitoring, integrating and interpreting the information provided by
automation.
No matter how new technologies in shipping are developed in the future, humans are
still the ship's controllers, and the competence of the crew is still the decisive factor in
determining the safety of the ship. If seafarers rely too much on new technology, ship
failures will not decrease in the future.
5.2.2 The impact of COVID-19 to ship failures
Since the outbreak of COVID-19 in early 2020, shipping and crew members have
suffered a huge impact due to the characteristics of ships' international navigation.
For ocean-going ships, surveyors and PSCOs are more cautious about contact with
crew on board. In fact, after the outbreak of the COVID-19, many local governments
have not allowed surveyors and PSCOs to board ships from abroad. A large number of

ship survey dates have been postponed for half a year or even longer, and PSC
inspection volumes in various ports have also dropped significantly.
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On 12 March, 2020, TOKYO MOU Secretariat issued Circular latter NO. 2020-2 to
its member states that the Secretariat had permitted ships’ surveys and valid of
certificates exceeded no more than 3 months due to the impact of COVID-19 (TOKYO
MOU, 2020). And on 2 June, 2020, the IMO issued Circular latter NO. 4204/Add.19
that the Administration could extend the period of validity of a certificate for no more
than 3 months (IMO, 2020). This makes the ship lack important safety barriers like
survey and PSC, which is not conducive to maintaining a safe state.

For crew members, many ports have banned them from disembarkation as a precaution
against COVID-19, leaving them unable to change shifts as planned. According to
IMO news, as of September 14, more than 300,000 seafarers cannot be repatriated,
and those on board have had their contracts extended, sometimes beyond 17 months

(IMO, 2020). Travel restrictions imposed by governments around the world have
created significant hurdles to crew changes and repatriation of seafarers, which has led
to a growing humanitarian crisis as well as significant concerns for the safety of
seafarers and shipping (IMO, 2020).
A large number of crew members have overdue service on the ship, which is extremely
unfavorable to the crew's mental state, and is more prone to fatigue and excessive
mental stress. In this state, human errors will increase significantly, and ship failures

are more likely to occur.
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION
As the CJK Fairway is located at the mouth of the Yangtze River, its hydrological
characteristics are relatively complex and changeable, which brings certain difficulties
to ship navigation. In addition, the CJK Fairway is densely navigable throughout the
year and there are many meeting points for ships. Ships navigating in the CJK Fairway
needs to frequently change the main engine load and course to keep the ship on a safe
route. This increases the probability of ship failures in the CJK Fairway.
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By analyzing the ship failure information collected by Wusong MSA in 2018 and 2019,
main engine failures accounted for the highest proportion of all failure types. Other
common failure types include steering gear failure, cooling water system failure, and
black, etc. Through the fault tree analysis method, it is also found that the main engine
failure has the greatest probability lead to the ship failure, which is consistent with the
actual data.
However, in quantitative analysis, because the probability of occurrence of each basic

event is difficult to accurately calculate, the author invited experts to estimate, which
is subjective.
Ship failures are very harmful to the environment and navigation safety of the Yangtze

River estuary areas and require the joint efforts of all departments of the entire industry.
Although the future will face the challenges from new technologies and COVID-19
epidemic, as long as the ship management companies, ships and competent authority
do their own work well, the probability of ship failures in the CJK Fairway will be

decreased.
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Appendix 1
Questionnaire
Dear experts, thank you for taking the time to participate in this questionnaire survey.
Please make an assessment of the probability of the following events occurring while
the ship is sailing in the CJK Fairway based on your work experience and knowledge.
Event Code

Event Name

Probability of failure happen

X1

ME exhaust valve fault

X2

ME supercharger fault

X3

ME fuel injection pipe fracture

X4

ME fuel injection pump fault

X5

ME fuel injector blockage

X6

ME fuel filter blockage

X7

ME water pump fault

X8

ME cylinder leakage

X9

ME control circuit board fault

X10

ME control air system fault

X11

ME lubricating filter block

X12

No back up filter
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X13
X14

Lubricating oil mixed with
impurities
Steering gear hydraulic
oil leakage

X15

Steering gear hydraulic pump
fault

X16

Rudder intertwine with rope

X17

Hydraulic control valve stuck

X18

Seawater inlet filter blocked

X19

Cooling pipe damage

X20

Large quantities of air enter the
cooling piping

X21

Generator engine suddenly shut
down

X22

Generator engine can’t reset in
short time

X23

Mis-operation

X24

Crew not familiar with the
system

X25

Fatigue

Your professional identity is: ___________________________________________
Thank you again for taking the time to participate in this survey. Wish you all the best!
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